

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 6011

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS 12-31-81

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJ: DPC MINISTERIAL MEETING DECEMBER 7, 1973: SUMMARY OF
RESTRICTED DISCUSSION - AGENDA ITEMS II AND III

STATE PLEASE PASS SECDEF, USCINCEUR, USNMR SHAPE, USLOSACLANT
AND CINCLANT; VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR.

SUMMARY: SECDEF PRESENTED BRIEFING ON PRELIMINARY MILITARY
LESSONS OF MIDDLE EAST. LUNS APPRAISAL SUGGESTED CONVENTIONAL
IMPROVEMENTS, EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT OIL, PAID TRIBUTE TO
US SUPPORT OF NATO. STEINHOFF EMPHASIZED NEED FOR WARNING TIME,
TANKS AND AIRCRAFT, EFFECT OF OIL CRISIS ON TRAINING. MINISTERS
ADDRESSED MBFR, LESSONS OF MIDDLE EAST, THE IMPACT OF OIL BOYCOTT,
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF DEFENSE, NEED FOR GREATER DEFENSE EFFORTS.
SECDEF TREATED US ALERT PROCEDURES, INTELLIGENCE, AIRLIFT,
BURDENSARING, AND THE 7 JUNE DPC INTERVENTION. END SUMMARY.

1. AFTER SECDEF BRIEFING ON MIDDLE EAST WAR MINISTERS' QUESTIONS
FOCUSED ON EXPERIENCE WITH WEAPON SYSTEMS, WARNING TIME,
AND INTELLIGENCE.

2. VREDELING (NETH) ASKED ABOUT ISRAELIS' QUICK ABILITY TO
USE NEW WEAPONS WITH MINIMUM ADAPTATION AND TRAINING. SECRETARY
PAID TRIBUTE TO ISRAELI TRAINING AND ABILITY TO ADAPT QUICKLY
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TO NEW WEAPON SYSTEMS.

3. LEBER (FRG) DISCUSSED POSSIBILITY OF SURPRISE ATTACK AND
UNDERLINED CRITICALITY OF FORCE AVAILABILITY WITHIN FIRST FEW

DAYS OF A BATTLE. THE IMPORTANCE OF TANK SPEARHEADS IN SOVIET ATTACKS CALLED FOR GREATLY INCREASED ANTI-TANK OPERATIONS BY NATO FORCES, ESPECIALLY AIR FORCES.

4. VANDEN BOEYNANTS (BELG) FOUND IT DISQUIETING THAT RUSSIANS COULD ARM AND TRAIN THEIR ALLIES SO QUICKLY WITHOUT ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE SERVICES KNOWING EXTENT. HE POINTED TO SIMPLICITY OF OPERATION OF MANY ANTI-TANK AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS AND CALLED FOR A NATO STUDY THAT WOULD MAKE SUGGESTIONS ON NATO ARMAMENTS. HE ECHOED LEBER'S POINT THAT FORCES MUST BE IN POSITION DURING THE FIRST 10 TO 15 DAYS AND CONTRASTED THE ATTRITION TO AIRLIFT IN ALL-OUT WAR ON THE CENTRAL FRONT WITH THE LACK OF ANY ATTRITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AIRLIFT.

5. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RESPONDED THAT WE MUST BE PREPARED FOR ALL CONTINGENCIES; WE MUST CAREFULLY MONITOR WARSAW PACT TROOP MOVEMENTS, AND TAKE PROPER PRECAUTIONS IF NECESSARY. HOWEVER, THE NATURE OF SURPRISE, ITS DEGREE AND QUALITY -- GRADATIONS OF FORCES, MOBILIZATION TIME, MOVEMENT TIME, DECEPTION, ETC. -- MUST ALSO BE STUDIED. WHEREAS WE CAN BE CONFIDENT OF OUR TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY, WE CANNOT BE AS CONFIDENT OF OUR ABILITY TO ASSESS POLITICALLY AND ACT UPON WARNING INDICATORS. HE THEN SAID, ALTHOUGH WE SHOULD BE IN POSITION TO COUNTER SURPRISE ATTACKS, WE SHOULD NOT BUILD INTO OUR MILITARY FORCES A TOTAL CAPABILITY TO OVERCOME A LACK OF POLITICAL DECISIVENESS. HE SAID WE MUST ALSO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE DAY WE RECEIVE WARNING SIGNALS AND THE DAY THE WAR BEGINS. WE SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT FORCES CANNOT BE MOVED AFTER RECEIVING A WARNING SIGNAL. THEREFORE, FORCES TAKING A PERIOD OF DAYS TO MOBILIZE AND MOVE MIGHT ACTUALLY BE ON THE FRONT LINES WHEN THE WAR BEGINS.

6. HE ANSWERED VANDEN BOEYNANTS BY SAYING IT WAS TRUE THAT NATO MUST GET THROUGH THE FIRST 10 TO 15 DAYS OF ANY CONFLICT. BUT WE MUST ALSO BE PREPARED TO GO BEYOND 15 DAYS, IF NECESSARY. FURTHERMORE, ALTHOUGH THE SEA LINE OF COMMUNICATION IS THREATENED BY EARLY SUBMARINE INTERDICTION, SOVIET AIR WOULD BE HARD PUT TODAY (NOT NECESSARILY IN THE FUTURE) TO INTERFERE WITH US AIR
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REINFORCEMENT IN EUROPE.

7. SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS SUMMED UP THIS PORTION OF THE DISCUSSION BY SUGGESTING THAT PERMREPS LOOK AT THE BROAD RANGE OF LESSONS LEARNED, ESPECIALLY SURPRISE ATTACK AND THE USE OF WARNING TIME, AND THE MILITARY COMMITTEE CONTINUE ITS STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF NEW WEAPONS AND THEIR COUNTER MEASURES.

8. MOD VERDELING ADDED TO LUNS' SUMMATION BY EMPHASIZING IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL EVALUATION. HE IMPLIED THAT US IS THE SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION, AND ASKED WHAT CAN EUROPEANS DO WHEN THEY ARE REASSURED SOVIETS WON'T ATTACK.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

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9. LUNS THEN MADE HIS APPRAISAL, WHICH DIFFERED FROM PREVIOUSLY RELEASED TEXT. HE CALLED ATTENTION TO THE EXPANSION OF SOVIET FORCE LEVELS AND CITED THIS AS A DANGER IN THE YEARS AHEAD. FOR THE PRESENT, A CREDIBLE CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY WAS WELL WITHIN OUR GRASP. IMPROVEMENTS HIGHLIGHTED BY AD-70 STUDIES MOVE SLOWLY OR NOT AT ALL. THE MILITARY MAKES A MISTAKE BY NOT ESTABLISHING PRIORITY WITHIN THE AD-70 LIST. HE QUOTED THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THAT MANY IMPROVEMENTS ARE NOT NECESSARILY EXPENSIVE AND URGED THAT NATO GET ON WITH IT. HE COMPARED CURRENT EVENTS IN EUROPE WITH THOSE BEFORE WORLD WAR II. AGAIN ONE SIDE IS ARMING TO THE TEETH, WHILE SIGNING NON-AGGRESSION PACTS. IN THE 1930S, POLITICAL LEADERS IN WESTERN EUROPE REFRAINED FROM NECESSARY REARMAMENT IN ORDER NOT TO PROVOKE THE AGGRESSOR OR FOR IDEOLOGICAL REASONS. PEOPLE WERE NOT TOLD THE TRUTH, AND WERE OVERWHELMED. HE SAID DEFENSE MINISTERS HAD A CLEAR DUTY TO SPEAK UP, TO EXPLAIN TO THEIR PARLIAMENTS AND THEIR PUBLICS THE DANGER AND THE NEED TO ALLOCATE RESOURCES TO MEET THAT DANGER. THE OIL EMBARGO COULD AFFECT DEFENSE EFFORT IN SOME COUNTRIES, AND IF THERE IS INSISTENCE, DEFENSE WILL TAKE ITS CUT ALONG WITH UNESSENTIAL CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES. HE PAID TRIBUTE TO THE STALWART SUPPORT OF THE ALLIANCE BY THE US, AND SAID JACKSON-NUNN WAS CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT EUROPEANS WOULD HAVE TO START SHARING A GREATER PORTION OF THE BURDEN.

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10. GENERAL STEINHOFF FOLLOWED. HE UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR EARLY INFORMATION ABOUT A POTENTIAL ATTACK, FOR A

LONG PERIOD OF USABLE WARNING TIME, AND GOOD CRISIS MANAGEMENT. HE ALSO SAID THAT, DESPITE THE EFFECT OF SAMs AND ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, THE TANK AND AIRCRAFT ARE STILL MAJOR OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. HE EMPHASIZED SPEED IN AIRLIFT/SEALIFT AND THE NEED FOR IDENTIFYING FRIENDLY FROM HOSTILE AIRCRAFT. THE OIL CRISIS THREATENS TO REDUCE TRAINING AMONG ALLIED FORCES AND THUS READINESS. ON THE NATO-WARSAW PACT BALANCE, THE TREND OF WIDENING DISPARITY IS STILL CONTINUING AND THERE WAS AN URGENT NEED FOR QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN NATO. ON STANDARDIZATION, A SPECIAL EFFORT FOR MORE COST EFFECTIVE, COMMON R&D, PROCUREMENT, LOGISTICS AND TRAINING IS REQUIRED. HE SAID AIR FORCES WERE IN GOOD PLACE TO BEGIN SPECIALIZATION.

11. MINISTER LEBER REGISTERED HIS CONCERN ABOUT MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID THE SOVIETS SEEM DETERMINED TO PERPETUATE THE ASYMMETRY OF THE BALANCE. THE WEST, THROUGH FRANK DISCUSSIONS, MUST DECIDE QUICKLY HOW GREAT A DEFENSE REDUCTION WE CAN AGREE UPON WITH THE SOVIETS. BELOW A CERTAIN CEILING YOU GET SO LITTLE DEFENSE THAT YOU WASTE MONEY. HE CALLED ON THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TO SET A CEILING BELOW WHICH NATO SHOULD NOT GO.

12. CARRINGTON PAID TRIBUTE TO THE SCHLESINGER BRIEFING. HE ASSUMED THE LESSONS LEARNED WERE PRELIMINARY AND SUGGESTED THE MILITARY COMMITTEE SHOULD ANALYZE AND REPORT ON THEM AT THE NEXT DPC. DIFFICULTIES EXIST FOR MINISTERS. MBFR AND OTHER NEGOTIATIONS MUST NOT BE SEEN BY THE PUBLIC AS THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE EXISTING DEFENSE FOR THE SHADOW OF DETENTE. DIFFERING VIEWS OF THE MIDDLE EAST WAR HAVE RAISED QUESTIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. THE ARAB BOYCOTT HAS BROUGHT INTO QUESTION THE CAPABILITY OF CERTAIN COUNTRIES TO SUSTAIN ADEQUATE DEFENSE AND EVEN THEIR ABILITY TO SURVIVE. THERE IS CONTINUING UNWILLINGNESS TO GIVE DEFENSE HIGH PRIORITY. THESE ARE POLITICAL, NOT MILITARY, MATTERS. POLITICIANS MUST LEAD. IT IS NOT ENOUGH FOR GOVERNMENTS TO FOLLOW THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, THEY MUST INFLUENCE PUBLIC OPINION.

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HE SAID MOST FRIENDS OF DEFENSE IN PARLIAMENT WERE WORLD WAR II VINTAGE. NATO MUST CLARIFY ITS RATIONALE AND BRING THE PUBLIC ALONG IF WE ARE TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE DEFENSE LEVELS.

15. VREDELING SAID THAT NETHERLANDS DEFENSE WOULD BE RESTRAINED BECAUSE OF THE OIL SHORTAGE. HE THANKED THE FRG AND THE US FOR THEIR ASSISTANCE IN REFUELING THE DUTCH AIR FORCE. HE QUESTIONED THE CONSEQUENCES IF NATO LACKED SOLIDARITY ON THIS ISSUE. HE "FORMALLY" NOTIFIED NATO OF THE NETHERLANDS' OIL SITUATION.

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14. SECRETARY SCHLESINGER TOOK UP SEVERAL POINTS
RAISED BY MINISTERS:

A. ON WARNING AND ALERT PROCEDURES, HE SAID US HAS RE-
EXAMINED PROCEDURES AND IS REVISING PROCEDURES SO MINISTERS
WOULD BE DIRECTLY INFORMED IF AN ALERT IS REQUIRED AGAIN. HE
SAID AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD WOULD BE INFORMED OF THE CHANGES MADE
SO HE CAN BRIEF THE COUNCIL.

B. ON SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES, HE SAID THAT SAM'S DID
NOT PUT ISRAELI AIR FORCE OUT OF ACTION. THE THREE
PERCENT ATTRITION RATE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR WAS
INTOLERABLE AND WAS REDUCED TO 1 PERCENT

C. ON INTELLIGENCE, HE AGREED TO A GREATER INTEGRATION
BETWEEN NATIONAL AND ALLIANCE EFFORTS AND HE PROMISED THE US
WOULD ENHANCE THE FLOW OF INTELLIGENCE.

D. ON STANDARDIZATION AND LOGISTICS, HE SAID HE HAD FORWARDED
TWO LETTERS RECEIVED FROM GENERAL GOODPASTER SHOWING HOW
MORE DEFENSE OUTPUT COULD BE OBTAINED FOR THE SAME MONEY.

3. ON AIRLIFT, WE HAVE COME A LONG WAY. WE NOW HAVE 300
C-5AS OR 747-EQUIVALENT AIRCRAFT. WE COULD DEPLOY TO
EUROPE A DIVISION EVERY 4 OR 5 DAYS, OR THE WHOLE ACTIVE US
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ARMY IN 40-50 DAYS. HE URGED ALL COUNTRIES TO WORK WITH THEIR
NATIONAL AIR LINES TO INSURE CONVERTIBILITY AND USABILITY
OF THEIR AIRCRAFT FOR CARGO AIRLIFT.

15. HE AGREED WITH LORD CARRINGTON THAT MINISTERS MUST SPEAK OUT AT HOME. HE URGED THAT THE COMMUNIQUE SAY THAT DEFENSE MINISTERS BELIEVE THE ALLIANCE CAN AND MUST DO MORE AND THAT MINISTERS ARE DETERMINED TO SPEAK OUT FOR GREATER DEFENSE EFFORTS.

16. HE SAID THE POLITICAL DIFFERENCE AND FERMENT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE OVER THE MIDDLE EAST WAR CAN BE BENEFICIAL IF THEY LEAD MEMBERS TO MAKE A GREATER EFFORT WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE NATO AREA. ONE EXAMPLE IS THE ENERGY CRISIS. NATO WAS CONCEIVED TO DEFEND AGAINST THREATS CONTIGUOUS TO NATIONAL BORDERS. THE ARAB BOYCOTT, HOWEVER, THREATENS THE ALLIANCE FROM OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA AND IN WAYS WHICH ARE NOT CONVENTIONAL. OIL IS REQUIRED FOR MODERN CIVILIZATION, AND THE LINES OF SUPPLY MUST BE PROTECTED AND THE ORIGINS ENSURED.

17. HE SAID THAT JACKSON-NUNN SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN A NARROW WAY, AS RELATING ONLY TO BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. THAT AMENDMENT IS SYMBOLIC OF A FEELING ON THE PART OF MANY AMERICANS THAT EUROPEANS SHOULD DO MORE. THE SUBORDINATION OF EUROPE BY THE SOVIETS WOULD BE DISASTROUS FOR THE US, BUT MORE SO FOR EUROPE.

18. VANDEN BOEYNANTS SAID DEFENSE MINISTERS MUST SING THE SAME TUNE. SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S JUNE 7 STATEMENT WAS FRANKLY UNHELPFUL TO HIM IN PARLIAMENT. HE CALLED FOR JOINT MEETINGS OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, FINANCE MINISTERS AND DEFENSE MINISTERS.

19. IN REPLY, SECDEF SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE DEFENSE MINISTERS NOT ONLY TO SING FROM THE SAME SCORE, BUT TO SING FROM A CORRECT SCORE. HE REVIEWED HIS JUNE 7 SPEECH CALLING FOR CONTINUING EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE, WHICH IS FAR FROM HOPELESS. HE SAID THIS ANALYSIS SHOULD HAVE LED TO JOY IN EUROPE, BUT, INSTEAD, BECAUSE OF THE MUTUAL SUSPICIONS THAT CHARACTERIZE THE ALLIANCE, IT WAS SEEN AS A COVER FOR A PLANNED UNILATERAL US WITHDRAWAL. ALLEGATIONS WERE ALSO MADE THAT THE JUNE 7 STATEMENT AND OTHER ACTIONS REPRESENTED FURTHER
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EVIDENCE OF US DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE HEADS OF ITS ALLIES. WE OUGHT TO AGREE THAT WE HAVE THE NUMERICAL INGREDIENTS FOR A CREDIBLE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE, BUT NEED QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS. WE OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO DISCUSS THE LARGER STRATEGIC ISSUES. THERE IS NO DOUBT ABOUT THE FORMIDABLE AND GROWING CAPABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION. A PESSIMISTIC VIEW OF THE BALANCE MIGHT SUGGEST WE NEED A LARGE IMPROVEMENT. EVEN TO MAKE A LARGE IMPROVEMENT, A SMALL STEP IS REQUIRED; NATO HAS TO GET ON WITH THE JOB AND DO MORE.

20. SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS CLOSED THE MEETING, SAYING IS WAS

THE BEST DPC SESSION HE HAS OBSERVED IN TWENTY-ONE YEARS OF
ATTENDANCE. RUMSFELD

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